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Foreign exchange rate interventions of the central banks for the emerging market 
economies are studied only to a limited extent. However, due to the different 
characteristics of these economies, especially in terms of the exchange rate dynamics, 
such an analysis can reveal important information. This study analyzes both the 
causes and the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions of the Central Bank of 
the Republic of Turkey in the post-crisis period. We find that, as officially stated by 
the Central Bank, the main motivation behind the interventions is the excessive 
volatility in the exchange rate. Regarding the effectiveness of the interventions, the 
large and isolated purchase-based interventions seem to be effective in decreasing the 
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I. Introduction 
There is a dense literature devoted to the foreign exchange market operations 
conducted by the central banks, which especially intensified after a considerable 
amount of countries have shifted to implementing inflation targeting regimes. The 
role of the exchange rates both as a policy variable and as a determinant of the price 
dynamics has been reexamined after then. In this context, the interventions of the 
central banks in the foreign exchange market, - both to affect the level of the 
exchange rates and to reduce the excess volatility, have also been analyzed in details. 
It has been argued in Domac and Mendoza (2002) that if foreign exchange 
interventions are carried out with finesse and sensibly, they could play a useful role 
under inflation targeting framework in containing the adverse effects of temporary 
exchange rate shocks on inflation and financial stability. Therefore, there is room for 
foreign exchange interventions in inflation targeting regimes, especially to reduce 
excessive fluctuations in the foreign exchange markets. However, the findings of 
Baillie and Osterberg (1997), Herrera and Ozbay (2005), Dominguez (1998) and 
Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) show that foreign exchange interventions do not have 
any significant impact on the volatility of the exchange rates. For that reason, it can be 
conveniently stated that the empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of foreign 
exchange interventions produce mixed results. 
On the other hand, the literature on foreign exchange interventions can further be 
improved in two directions. First, there are only a limited number of studies that 
concentrate on the emerging market economies, with the important exceptions of 
Agcaer (2003) and Herrera and Ozbay (2005).  However, characterized by having 
unstable foreign exchange markets, fragile financial sector, and an ambiguous relation 
between the exchange rates and the interest rates, emerging market cases can reveal 
important information about the dynamics of foreign exchange interventions of the 
central banks. Second, despite the vast amount of studies that study the effectiveness 
of central bank interventions, only a few of them such as Kim and Sheen (2002), 
McKenzie (2004) and Ito and Yabu (2004) focused on the causes of these 
interventions. However, pinning down the factors that cause central banks to intervene 
can better reveal the goals and the preferences of the policymakers. Furthermore, 
assessing these factors together with the results obtained from these interventions will   3
provide better information about the success of the central banks in the foreign 
exchange markets. 
Based on the above discussion, this study analyzes both the causes and the 
effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions for the Turkish economy in the post-
crisis period. While a probit model and Granger causality tests are applied to 
determine the factors that lead to the intervention of the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey (CBRT henceforth) in the foreign exchange market, a GARCH framework 
is employed to evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions for the sample period. 
Such a framework makes it possible to test whether the foreign exchange 
interventions are effective on both the level and the volatility of the exchange rate. 
Finally, the results obtained from the Granger causality tests will also reveal whether 
the signaling channel operates as expected: if the interventions of the central banks 
provide signals about the future course of the monetary policy, i.e. if intervention 
variables Granger cause interest rates, then signaling channel is supported.  
The Turkish economy in the post crisis period, as our case study, constitutes a very 
interesting case for two reasons. First, after the collapse of the exchange rate based 
stabilization program in February 2001, there was a high degree of uncertainty in the 
foreign exchange markets, which further intensified with a high degree of political 
instability. These developments had induced the CBRT to take precautionary actions 
and stabilize the market. Second, this period witnessed some criticisms about the 
operation of the uncovered interest rate parity condition. The investors mostly 
perceived an increase in the interest rates as an overall increase in the risk that is 
inherent in the economy while a decrease led to opposite effects. Therefore, a change 
in the interest rates actually led to unexpected fluctuations in the foreign exchange 
market, which makes the problem at hand even more challenging.  
When all of these above-mentioned factors are combined with the attempts of the 
CBRT to shift to an inflation-targeting regime, an analysis of the foreign exchange 
interventions becomes far from being straightforward. In line with the objective of 
inflation targeting framework, the CBRT has explicitly stated that it would be ready to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market to remove any excess volatility that could 
have damaged the well functioning of the financial markets. Therefore, this study will   4
also reveal whether the official statements of the CBRT are supported by the 
empirical findings. 
The outline of this study is as follows: The following two sections briefly summarize 
the characteristics of the foreign exchange market for the Turkish economy and 
present a brief discussion of the factors that lead the central banks to intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets.
1 Then, the causes of the CBRT’s interventions are 
analyzed both by a probit model and Granger causality tests. The latter exercise will 
also reveal whether the signaling channel is valid. Next, the effectiveness of these 
interventions is evaluated within a GARCH framework. The final section concludes.   
II. The Turkish Economy  
This section first presents an overview of the macroeconomic environment for the 
Turkish economy in the post-crisis period, with a special emphasis on the foreign 
exchange markets and the interventions conducted by the CBRT. In the next section, 
there is a brief discussion that focuses on the factors that may induce the central banks 
to conduct foreign exchange market interventions. 
II.1. Macroeconomic Environment 
As implied in the preceding section, the recent historical record of the Turkish 
economy exhibits a structure in which there is a clear overlapping between the 
exchange rate volatility and the interest rate instability. The unstable growth 
performance, persistently high inflation under the constraints of the public sector 
deficits and the volatile short-term capital flows that are accompanied by political 
instability are other important characteristics. Therefore, it is not surprising to witness 
a series of economic crises in the last decade: the currency crisis in 1994, contagion 
effects of both the Asian and Russian crises in 1997 and 1998, and finally the deep 
financial crises in November 2000 and February 2001. Following each crisis, some 
regulatory arrangements and structural reforms were put into effect by the Turkish 
authorities, where the IMF supported almost all of the attempts.  
 
                                                           
1 The literature survey about the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions are skipped since it is 
already documented in Sarno and Taylor (2001).   5
Recently, the financial turmoil following the twin crises in November 2000 and 
February 2001 led to the adoption of a floating exchange rate, where the program’s 
policies have been significantly strengthened relative to its predecessors, including an 
increased emphasis on transparency, accountability and good governance in both the 
private and the public sectors. Furthermore, the control of the CBRT over the short-
term interest rates was strengthened in line with the adoption of the floating exchange 
rate regime. Finally, monetary policy was foreseen as evolving towards a regime of 
formal inflation targeting by an independent CBRT. On the other hand, although 
committed to the floating exchange rate regime, the monetary authority has also 
indicated that it may intervene in the market to smooth out excessive short-run 
exchange rate volatility. The CBRT would stand ready to conduct foreign exchange 
purchase auctions to improve the international reserve position conditional on the 
strength of the balance of payments position and the reverse currency substitution. 
Although the explicit statements of the CBRT and the floating exchange rate regime 
seemed to offer a clear picture in terms of the foreign exchange markets, there were 
two critical issues to be taken into account. The first issue was the huge level of debt 
stock for the government together with the excessively high interest rates. There were 
serious doubts about the sustainability of debt, which induced investors to demand 
high levels of risk returns. In such an environment, targeting inflation and following 
tight monetary policy as a means of price stability could certainly have negative 
impact on the debt burden. Second, the relationship between interest rates and 
exchange rates was not clear, at best. The recent studies that analyze the validity of 
the uncovered interest rate parity condition for the emerging market economies point 
out that an increase in the interest rates to achieve low levels of inflation can also be 
anticipated as an increase in overall risk in the economy, which in turn, could cause 
depreciation of the domestic currency. In such a case, the effects of tight monetary 
policy on the exchange rate dynamics cannot be foreseen to full extent.
 2   
                                                           
2 See Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) for a detailed discussion.   6
CBRT Interventions and Auctions 
Following the February 2001 crisis, the monetary and exchange rate policies of the 
CBRT were made explicit by the official statement published on early 2002. There, 
CBRT highlighted that it was not going to infer to the level or trend of the exchange 
rate, but only intervene in a strictly limited fashion to limit the excessive volatility in 
the exchange rate market. Despite the fact that the exchange rate system was a float –
or “almost pure float”-, the level of foreign exchange reserves was important both 
because of the forthcoming debt repayments to the IMF and the CBRT’s intension to 
clear some of the foreign exchange liabilities like the deposits of the workers abroad. 
Therefore, CBRT also announced that it would stand ready to conduct transparent and 
pre-announced purchase auctions conditional on the strong balance of payments 
position and ongoing reverse currency substitution.
3,4  
In this framework, CBRT had two main channels to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market: pre-announced auctions and the interventions. After the initial impact of the 
financial crisis has been removed, the Turkish lira is observed to have a steady 
appreciation trend against US dollar. Therefore, the interventions were mainly in the 
form of purchases (Table 1). Also, on the auction side, the total number of auctions 
that are held by the CBRT is 243 and 150 of these auctions are in the form of 
purchases. Similar to the interventions, the purchase auctions also take place in the 
second and third quarters of 2003 (Table 2).
5  
Table 1: Volatility Interventions (2001-2003) 











2003 Net Purchase  4229
Source: CBRT 
                                                           
3 Ozatay (2004). 
4 Pre-announced auctions started in April 2002. 
5 In 2001, the primary purpose of the foreign exchange sale auctions and sale interventions was to 
eliminate the liquidity-increasing effect of the utilization of the IMF credit used by the Treasury for 
domestic financing. Therefore, these operations should be evaluated separately.    7
Table 2: Sale and Purchase Auctions (2001-2003)  
Sale Auctions    Purchase Auctions  






January     January     January    
February   February    February   
March 350  March    March   
April 1040  April  280  April   
May 1130  May  242  May  340 
June 1198  June  273  June  630 
July 1035  July    July  990 
August 600  August    August  1,050 
September 380  September    September  1,316.7 
October 420  October    October  1,325.6 
November 400  November   November  
December     December     December    
Net Purchase  6553     795     5652,3 
Source: CBRT 
 
Regarding the foreign exchange auction system, the CBRT pre-announced the terms 
of the auction at the beginning of each month, thus leaving no room for a surprise for 
the market agents. Therefore, auctions differ significantly from the interventions. 
Given the primary aim of building up reserves, the effectiveness of auctions is much 
more straightforward to identify and they do not serve the purpose of reducing the 
excess volatility. Therefore, this study focuses more on the interventions and attempts 
to reveal whether the CBRT’s intention to dampen excessive volatility in foreign 
exchange market is supported by the empirical findings (Figure 1). 
 

























































































































































































































































Exchange Rate Auctions (Net-Million USD)
CBRT Reserves (Million USD)
 
              Source: CBRT   8
Consequently, the message to be drawn from this section is clear: the Turkish foreign 
exchange market seems to inherit the general characteristics of the emerging markets. 
The unclear relation between the exchange rates and the interest rates, and the excess 
sensitivity of the foreign exchange markets to both economic and non-economic 
factors make it necessary for CBRT to closely monitor and intervene in the market to 
remove excess volatility in the exchange rate. Such a motive does not contradict with 
the inflation-targeting framework that has been implemented in the post-crisis period. 
 III.  Why do Central Banks Intervene? 
Despite the vast literature on the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions, only 
a few studies focused on the factors that induce central banks to intervene in the 
market. Most of these studies such as Herrera and Ozbay (2005), McKenzie (2004) 
and Ito and Yabu (2004) analyze the issue in a discrete choice model framework.  In 
an earlier study, Kim and Sheen (2002), using probit and friction models for the case 
of Australia, show that exchange rate trend correction, exchange rate volatility 
smoothing, overnight interest rate differentials and the profitability with foreign 
currency reserve inventory considerations determine the intervention behavior. With 
the exception of Herrera and Ozbay (2005), these studies focus solely on the 
industrialized economies. However, as mentioned in the preceding section, emerging 
markets may reveal important information about the foreign exchange market 
interventions, thanks to their different macroeconomic dynamics.  
Although using different techniques, one common characteristic of the above-
mentioned studies is that the exchange rate volatility emerges as the main motivation 
behind the central bank interventions. Therefore, it is important to review the findings 
about the relationship between exchange rate volatility and interventions. It has been 
often stated by the central banks that exchange rate volatility is the main motivation 
behind the central bank interventions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the recent 
studies focused on the effects of intervention on the exchange rate volatility. Most of 
these studies have looked at the relation between foreign exchange intervention and 
the conditional exchange rate volatility, usually via GARCH models. Dominguez 
(1998), for example, examines the effects of the US, German and Japanese monetary 
and intervention policies on dollar-mark and dollar-yen exchange rate volatility over 
the 1977-1994 period. The results indicate that intervention operations generally   9
increase exchange rate volatility. This is particularly true of secret interventions that 
are undertaken without notification of the public. In another study, Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner (1996) examine the effects of the central bank interventions on the ex ante 
volatility of the US dollar-German mark and the US dollar-Japanese yen from 1985 to 
1991. They find little support for the hypothesis that central bank intervention is 
associated either with a positive change in the ex ante exchange rate volatility or with 
no change at all.  
Domac and Mendoza (2002) investigate whether central bank foreign exchange 
interventions have any impact on the volatility of the exchange rate in Mexico and 
Turkey since the adoption of the floating regime. Their empirical results suggest that 
both the amount and the frequency of the foreign exchange interventions have 
decreased the volatility of the exchange rates in these countries.  
Finally, it should be noted that, there may also be other important factors that may 
lead the central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market. However, these 
factors are viewed to be important as long as they cause an increase in the volatility of 
the exchange rate. In this context, political instability, the perceived risk in the 
economy or changes in the monetary policy emerge as possible candidates. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis should also take these factors into account. 
IV. Empirical Analysis  
IV.1. Causes of Intervention 
In this section, we employ two methodologies, probit analysis and Granger-causality 
tests, to have a better understanding of the main motivations behind the CBRT 
interventions. The results of both methodologies are discussed and compared as an 
attempt to find a robust conclusion. Such an exercise is also important from two 
different perspectives: First, as mentioned before, in an inflation-targeting framework, 
the changes in the exchange rate is not of primary interest as long as price dynamics 
are not distorted, which implies that the central banks can intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to remove any excess volatility in the exchange rates, but should not 
view the level of the exchange rate as a target. Actually, this implication is explicitly 
stated by the CBRT. Therefore, the results will reveal whether the official statements 
of the CBRT are consistent with its actions. Second, the causality tests will indicate   10
whether the signaling channel is valid for the foreign exchange interventions 
conducted by the CBRT. If foreign exchange interventions precede changes in the 
interest rates, then it is a sign for the existence of the signaling channel. 
IV.1.1. Probit Analysis 
There are several motives behind the central banks’ intervention in foreign exchange 
markets. Kim and Sheen (2002) range these motives as perceived trend correction, 
volatility smoothing, exchange rate overshooting, profitability and inventory 
considerations. There is, on the other hand, considerable evidence indicating that 
central banks do mostly respond to trend changes (i.e., reacting to deviations of the 
spot rate from some target level) and to exchange rate volatility.  
Following Kim and Sheen (2002), we estimate a probit model to determine the 
probability of purchase and sale interventions of the CBRT.
6 For this purpose, we 
generate a binary choice dependent variable corresponding to outcomes for both types 
of interventions (purchase/sale). Considering the scope of this study and intervention 
policy of the CBRT, we basically test if the CBRT intervene in order to change 
exchange rate trend or reduce excessive volatility, and model the probability of 
purchase and sale interventions separately as the following form: 
Prob(Intvp,s,t=1|FX)=F(α 0 + α 1VOLt + α 2ERDEVt ) 
Intv is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a foreign exchange 
intervention, -either purchase or sale-, and zero otherwise. FX indicates the variables 
related to foreign exchange measures. These variables include the volatility, VOL, and 
the deviations from the long-run trend, ERDEV. We measured volatility with the 
conditional variance of daily exchange rate changes generated from a GARCH(1,1) 
model estimated in Section IV.2.
7 The volatility variable is expected to have positive 
effect on both purchase and sale intervention probabilities given the CBRT’s volatility 
intervention strategy described in the preceding section. Similarly, the current 
exchange rate deviations from the long-run trend, denoted by ERDEV, which are 
calculated as positive (negative) percentage deviations of the current exchange rate 
from its 90-day moving average, is expected to have a negative (positive) effect on the 
                                                           
6 In a similar vein, Fatum (2000) estimated Logit functions to investigate the factors influencing the 
likelihood of the success of intervention operations. 
7 Several volatility measures are used, but the results remained robust.   11
purchase intervention probability, or vice versa, for the sale intervention probability.
8 
In other words, ERDEV can be an indicator for the direction of the volatility in the 
exchange rate, that is VOL.  One can expect that if the volatility is high and downward 
(upward), then purchase (sale) intervention probability should increase. The 
estimation results for each of the purchase and sale interventions are presented in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Probit Estimation Results 
(Sample: May 16, 2001 to December 31, 2003) 
Prob(Intp-s,t=1| VOL, ERDEV, ) = F(α 0 +α 1VOLt + α 2ERDEVt ) 
   Purchase   Sale 
2.01 4.29 
α 0  
(2.1)* (2.42)* 
0.36 0.73 
α 1  
(3.60)** (3.93)** 
-4.84 9.01 
α 2  
(-4.90)** (2.77)** 
LR 21.1  106.85 
Prob.  (0.00) (0.00) 
Z-values are in parenthesis. *, ** denote significance at 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
Estimation results show that purchase and sale intervention probabilities respond 
positively and significantly to the changes in the exchange rate volatility, VOL, which 
indicates that a higher probability of intervention by the CBRT is associated with a 
higher volatility in the Turkish lira-US dollar rate. The probability of intervention is 
also significantly associated with the current exchange rate deviations, ERDEV. It 
should be reminded that ERDEV is positive in the depreciation trend, and negative in 
the appreciation trend. Therefore, as expected, the signs of effects are estimated to be 
positive and significant for the sale intervention, and negative and significant for the 
purchase intervention. Thus, the results verify the official statement of the CBRT, 
indicating its intention to intervene in the market when there is high volatility in the 
Turkish lira–US dollar rate. Also as expected, the action is a purchase intervention 
when the Turkish lira is in appreciation trend, and a sale intervention, otherwise.  
These results suggest that, as officially stated by the CBRT, the volatility of the 
exchange rate seems to be the main driving force of the intervention probability at the 
                                                           
8 Percentage deviations of the current exchange rate from 5- and 30-day moving average were also 
tested, but the results did not change.   12
expected directions, providing empirical support for the “leaning against the wind” 
hypothesis.  
IV.1.2. Granger Causality Tests 
In this section, in order to examine whether intervention operations predict future 
changes in the monetary policy; that is, whether intervention provides a signal for the 
future monetary policy, we conduct Granger causality tests as suggested by Lewis 
(1993).
9 Besides the effectiveness of the signaling channel, Granger causality 
framework also allows us to test whether the monetary policy variables help predict 
the CBRT interventions. For this purpose, we estimate a bivariate Vector 
autoregression (VARs) for each monetary policy variable and intervention. The 


































− =  
E ( t ε t ε ′ )=V 
where M(i) denotes monetary policy variables such as money base, MONBASE, short 
term interest rates, CBRATE, as well as variables such as CBRT reserves, CBRES, 
exchange rate volatility, VOL, and exchange rate deviation from its 90 days average, 
ERDEV. Also, INTV(j) is the intervention variable indicating purchase (j=p) and sale 
(j=s), and  t ε is a bivariate i.i.d. random variable with zero mean.    
Granger causality test results are displayed in Table 4.
10 It has been found that there is 
no causality between both types of interventions and the base money. On the other 
hand, the short-term interest rate Granger-causes only intervention sales. It is also 
found that there is causality running from both sale and purchase based interventions 
to CBRT interest rates. These results have several implications: First, as consistent 
with the CBRT’s announcements, short-term interest rate emerges as the main 
                                                           
9 Lindberg (1994) also used Granger causality to test whether sterilized interventions work through the 
signalling channel for the Sweden.  
10 The LR test results for lag length selection are not presented but available upon request.   13
monetary policy instrument. Second, interventions in the foreign exchange market 
signal the future course of monetary policy; that is, both purchase and sale based 
interventions Granger-cause CBRT interest rate changes. However, the existence of 
“signaling channel” in case of sale interventions should be evaluated cautiously in 
that, if the central bank intervenes in the markets with a sale operation, then it should 
signal a tight monetary policy, which would require an increase in the interest rates. 
However, there is only a single observation of a rate increase in the sample period. 





Sample: May 16, 2001- December 31, 2003 
Granger Causality Tests between Monetary Variables and Intervention Purchase  
A. Predicted Variables (causality from purchase intervention to...) 
Frequency MONBASE  CBRATE  CBRES  Vol  ERDEV 
Daily 14.9  25.41  8.49  20.15  6.81 
   (0.24) (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.81) 
B. Cauual Variables (causality to purchase intervention from...) 
Frequency MONBASE  CBRATE  CBRES  Vol  ERDEV 
Daily 15.1  20.46  4.68  8.98  3.54 
   (0.24) (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.62)  (0.98) 
Granger Causality Tests between Monetary Variables and Intervention Sale      
A. Predicted Variables (causality from sale intervention to...) 
Frequency MONBASE  CBRATE  CBRES  Vol  ERDEV 
Daily 6.74  150.64  137.37  42.04  60.87 
   (0.98) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
B. Causal Variables (causality to sale intervention from...) 
Frequency MONBASE  CBRATE  CBRES  Vol  ERDEV 
Daily  6.87  139.71 97.76  29.71  74.81 
   (0.98) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
P-values are in the parenthesis.  
 
Moreover, both the purchase and the sale interventions Granger-cause CBRT 
reserves. However, there is an asymmetry where CBRT reserves Granger cause only 
the sale interventions, indicating that the strong reserve position of the CBRT seems 
to be an important factor for the sale interventions in the case of depreciating 
domestic currency. In other words, the CBRT intends to conduct sale operations only 
when it has enough foreign exchange reserves.  
                                                           
11 The intervention variables are lagged one period to see the possible influence of intervention after the 
sterilization process has been completed. However, the results do not change significantly. Hence the 
results are not reported in the table but available upon request.    14
Both purchase and sale interventions Granger cause exchange rate volatility, implying 
that any type of CBRT interventions lead to changes in the volatility in the foreign 
exchange market. However, test results do not reveal any information about the sign 
of the volatility changes. Therefore, GARCH framework is applied to examine the 
effectiveness of these interventions. Moreover, only the volatility in the foreign 
exchange markets Granger-cause sale interventions. Finally, while there is a two-way 
causality between ERDEV and sale interventions, there is no causality found between 
purchase interventions and ERDEV.  
As a result, the probit analysis and the Granger causality tests provide insights about 
the motivation of the CBRT in intervening the foreign exchange market. First, 
consistent with the official statement of the CBRT, an increase in the volatility 
induces an intervention, as the probit analysis suggests. As mentioned before, there is 
room for such a policy in an inflation-targeting framework. On the other hand, 
although a two-way causality between interest rates and interventions has been found, 
the results do not completely favor the existence of signaling channel, at least for the 
sale interventions in the examined period. 
IV.2. Effects of Intervention: GARCH Framework 
The last section implies that, the interventions of central banks in the foreign 
exchange market need not contradict with the characteristics of an inflation-targeting 
framework. In fact, the findings suggest that the CBRT conducts interventions to 
remove any excess volatility in the market.  
Then, it should be examined whether these operations have become effective. Time 
series techniques are one of the most popular techniques that have been widely used 
to analyze the effectiveness of the foreign exchange interventions. Both the effects of 
changes in the fundamentals and the other relevant variables -such as the specific type 
of intervention- that are known to affect the exchange rates can be controlled. In this 
context, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models, which provide a 
framework to test the effectiveness of the interventions simultaneously on both the 
mean and the conditional variance of the exchange rates, are widely employed. In this 
section, a GARCH framework is employed for the post crisis period, that is May 16, 
2001 to December 31, 2003.  
   15
The mean and the variance equations are in the following forms: 
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Throughout the analysis, we employ fundamentals -that are known to affect the level 
and the variance of the exchange rate- and the intervention variables both in the mean 
and in the variance equations. DLUSD is the log difference form of the Turkish lira-
US dollar exchange rate. INT is the secondary market Treasury bill rate to account for 
the relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rates. EMBI is the Turkish 
government bonds spread, used as a proxy for risk measurement. In the core model 
(Model 1), only the fundamentals are employed.  
As the previous analysis suggests, the exchange rate dynamics and the intervention 
variables affect each other contemporaneously. Therefore, the lagged value of the 
latter has been used to avoid a possible simultaneity problem. Among intervention 
variables, to account for the asymmetric effects of purchases and sales on the 
exchange rate, these variables, which are denoted as INTP  and INTS, are used 
separately in Model 2. Also, following Beine and Szafarz (2003), we have created 
several dummy variables: (i) in model 3, successive  intervention dummy variable 
takes the value of one for the purchases (sales), DSUCINTP (DSUCINTS), if 
intervention at day t is preceded by intervention in the same direction at day from t-1 
to t-15, and zero otherwise; (ii) in model 4, isolated intervention dummy variable 
takes the value of one for the purchases (sales), DISOINTP (DISOINTS), if 
intervention at day t is preceded by no intervention in a 15-day period; (iii) finally, in 
models 5 and 6, size dummy variables are generated separately for large purchases 
(sales),  DLINTP (DLINTS), and small purchases (sales), DSINTP(DSINTS), where 
large (small) intervention dummy variable takes the value of one if the amount of 
intervention / reserves ratio at day t is greater (less) than the whole sample average of 
daily the intervention, and zero otherwise.  
In Model 1, we run the regression, where the contemporaneous values of the INT and 
the EMBI spread appear both in the mean and the variance equations, whereas the 
lagged values of the exchange rate change appear only in the mean equation. Interest   16
rates are estimated to be positive and statistically significant in the mean equations of 
all the models. EMBI spread, on the other hand, is estimated to be positive and 
significant mostly in the variance equations. These results support the arguments of 
Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2003), which state that an increase in 
interest rates to achieve low levels of inflation may actually cause depreciation of the 
domestic currency, which is caused by a higher risk perception in the economy. All of 
these results regarding purchases and sales can be seen in Table 5 and Table 6 
respectively.  
Table 5: GARCH Estimation Results - Purchase Interventions 
Mean Equation    DLUSDt= β 0+β 1DLUSDt-1 + β 2DLUSDt-2 +β 3INTt + β 4EMBIt + β 5INTVp,t-1+ ε t 
Core Model  Intervention  Successive  Isolated  Large  Small 
   INTP  DSUCINTP  DISOINTP  DLINTP  DSINTP 
  
(Model 1)  (Model 2)  (Model 3)  (Model 4)  (Model 5)  (Model 6) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
β 0  
(-1.75)* (-1.75)*  (-1.77)*  (-1.70)*  (-1.66)*  (-1.74)* 
0.066 0.061 0.059  0.010  0.006  0.062 
β 1  
(1.51) (1.37) (1.33)  (0.23)  (0.14)  (1.38) 
-0.079 -0.083 -0.086 -0.02  -0.020  -0.083 
β 2  
(-1.96)** (-2.04)** (-2.11)** (-0.50) (-0.48) (-2.04)** 
0.001 0.001 0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001 
β 3  
(5.70)** (5.68)** (5.64)**  (8.64)**  (8.66)**  (5.60)** 
0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
β 4  
(1.59) (1.65)* (1.69)*  (2.39)**  (2.34)**  (1.62) 
-0.001 -0.002  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001 
β 5  
-  (-0.75) (-1.17)  (-0.19)  (-1.35)  (-0.87) 
Variance Equation             ht = α 0 +α 1ht-1 + α 2ε t
2 + α 3INTt + α 4EMBIt +α 5INTVp,t-1 
9.41E-09 3.55E-08 1.32E-07  -5.40E-06  -5.57E-06  2.60E-07 
α 0  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)  (-3.95)**  (-2.93)**  (0.08) 
0.244 0.244 0.246  0.215  0.210  0.236 
α 1  
(4.98)** (4.80)** (4.80)**  (5.25)**  (5.23)**  (4.90)** 
0.663 0.665 0.661  0.675  0.684  0.676 
α 2  
(12.36)** (12.66)** (12.57)**  (16.80)**  (19.85)**  (12.78)** 
5.30E-06 5.25E-06 5.21E-06  8.44E-06  8.56E-06  5.08E-06 
α 3  
(1.71)* (1.68)*  (1.65)*  (3.16)**  (3.30)**  (1.63) 
1.39E-06 1.36E-06 1.33E-06  3.20E-06  3.13E-06  1.22E-06 
α 4  
(2.22)** (2.62)** (2.54)**  (15.89)**  (36.63)**  (1.91)* 
1.15E-06 4.02E-06  -3.51E-0.5  -3.20E-05  6.89E-06 
α 5  
- 
(0.84) (0.63)  (-2.99)**  (-3.65)**  (0.95) 
Q(20)  28.34 27.81 27.09 25.97  26.31  27.05 
Q
2(20)  25.53 26.04 26.56 28.70  27.39  26.19 
AIC  -6.62 -6.61 -6.61  -6.56  -6.56  -6.61 
SC  -6.55 -6.53 -6.53  -6.48  -6.48  -6.53 
LnL  2197.42 2197.67 2198.13 2181.58  2180.95  2198.01 
Figures in parenthesis are z-values. *, ** denote significance at 10 and 5 percent significance levels, 
respectively. The critical value of Χ
2(20) is 31.41 at 5 percent significance level. 
 
In the following models, to account for the possible asymmetric effects of purchase 
and sale interventions, the intervention variables and the relevant dummies are tested 
separately. As Table 5 and Table 6 report, both purchase and sale interventions –in all 
specifications- are estimated to have insignificant impact on the depreciation rate, 
also, sale interventions lead to higher volatility in the exchange rate whereas purchase   17
interventions are estimated to be insignificant in the variance equation. These results 
may indicate that CBRT’s interventions are not effective in “leaning against the 
wind”. In addition, they also do not serve the purpose of decreasing the volatility of 
the exchange rate. 
 Table 6: GARCH Estimation Results - Sale Interventions 
Mean Equation    DLUSDt= β 0+β 1DLUSDt-1 + β 2DLUSDt-2 +β 3INTt + β 4EMBIt + β 5INTVs,t-1+ ε t 
Core Model  Intervention  Successive  Isolated  Large  Small 
   INTS  DSUCINTS  DISOINTS  DLINTS  DSINTS 
 
(Model 1)  (Model 2)  (Model 3)  (Model 4)  (Model 5)  (Model 6) 
-0.002  -0.002  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002  -0.002 
β 0  
(-1.75)* (-1.76)*  (-1.75)*  (-1.77)*  (-1.65)** (-1.84)* 
0.066  0.068  0.063 0.062 0.058  0.073 
β 1  
(1.51)  (1.62)  (1.51) (1.42) (1.38)  (1.73) 
-0.079  -0.073  -0.073 -0.081 -0.074  -0.073 
β 2  
(-1.96)** (-1.79)*  (-1.81)*  (-2.01)**  (-1.84)*  (-1.79)* 
0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 
β 3  
(5.70)**  (5.52)**  (5.57)** (5.80)** (5.63)**  (5.49)** 
0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 
β 4  
(1.59)  (1.57)  (1.55) (1.62) (1.45)  (1.68) 
0.001  0.001 -0.006 0.001  -0.001 
β 5  
-  (0.08)  (0.37) (-1.43) (0.02)  (-0.07) 
Variance Equation             ht = α 0 +α 1ht-1 + α 2ε t
2 + α 3INTt + α 4EMBIt +α 5INTVs,t-1 
9.41E-09  3.04E-06  2.80E-06 1.01E-07 1.62E-06  3.12E-06 
α 0  
(0.01)  (1.12)  (1.11) (-0.03) (0.76)  (1.08) 
0.244  0.194  0.188 0.231 0.171  0.217 
α 1  
(4.98)**  (3.95)**  (3.94)** (5.02)** (3.70)**  (4.31)** 
0.663  0.681  0.697 0.685 0.745  0.649 
α 2  
(12.36)** (9.12)**  (9.94)**  (13.49)**  (11.91)** (9.64)** 
5.30E-06  3.76E-06  3.52E-06 5.20E-06 3.48E-06  4.34E-06 
α 3  
(1.71)* (1.40)  (1.31)  (1.71)*  (1.32)  (1.57) 
1.39E-06 8.06-07  7.43E-07  1.29E-06  6.836E-07  9.61E-07 
α 4  
(2.22)** (1.94)*  (1.88)*  (2.08)**  (1.98)** (2.14)** 
0.001  0.001 -8.24E-05 0.001  0.001 
α 5  
- 
(1.84)* (1.87)* (-2.59)** (1.85)* (1.78)* 
Q(20) 28.34 28.16 26.15 28.57 25.40 29.52 
Q
2(20) 25.53 24.12  24.36 25.66 25.10  23.77 
AIC -6.62  -6.63  -6.63 -6.61 -6.62  -6.63 
SC -6.55  -6.55  -6.55 -6.53 -6.54  -6.55 
LnL 2197.42 2204.20  2204.59 2198.14 2201.41  2203.95 
Figures in parenthesis are z-values. *, ** denote significance at 10 and 5 percent significance levels, 
respectively. The critical value of Χ
2(20) is 31.41 at 5 percent significance level.   18
Nevertheless, when dummy variables characterizing the size and the persistence of the 
interventions are tested in the consecutive models, the results change to some extent. 
As Table 5 reports, isolated and large purchase interventions are estimated to have 
negative effect on the volatility of the exchange rate. In Model 3 and Model 6, 
successive and small purchase interventions are estimated to be insignificant. On the 
sales side, as Table 6 reports, all types of interventions, except the isolated ones, are 
estimated to be significant and positive indicating that these interventions lead to 
higher volatility, whereas, only isolated sale interventions result in lower volatility in 
the exchange rate.  
Consequently, the above analysis suggests that neither purchase nor sale interventions 
are effective in changing the level of the exchange rate. Such a finding is in line with 
the official statement of the CBRT declaring explicitly that it has no intention to 
intervene the level or the trend of the exchange rate. The main purpose of the 
interventions is announced to decrease the short-run fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
In that respect, large and isolated purchase interventions as well as the isolated sale 
ones seem to be effective. This result may indicate that the strength of the CBRT in 
the foreign exchange market, which is measured by the size of the intervention, 
matters to some extent. However, the estimation results on sale interventions should 
be evaluated cautiously, because these operations dominantly took place in 2001, 
which is a period where markets were not yet stabilized.
12 Therefore, the analysis 
period may not be appropriate to draw sound conclusions on the effectiveness of the 
CBRT’s sale interventions.  
As a side result, the “uncovered interest rate parity” condition points out that a 
decrease in the interest rates by the CBRT leads to appreciation of the domestic 





                                                           
12 In 2001, the primary purpose of the foreign exchange sale auctions and sale interventions was to 
eliminate the liquidity-increasing effect of the utilization of the IMF credit used by the Treasury for 
domestic debt financing. Therefore, these operations should be evaluated separately.   19
V. Conclusion 
There is a dense literature regarding both the causes and the effectiveness of the 
central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market. However, most of these 
studies stop short of extending their analysis to emerging market economies. These 
economies are mostly characterized by having shallow foreign exchange markets and 
therefore exhibit excess sensitivity to capital flows. Also, most of these countries have 
started to implement either implicit or explicit forms of inflation targeting, which have 
reshaped their preferences toward exchange rate targets. Adding highly dynamic 
macroeconomic environment and the uncertainty about the operation of the uncovered 
interest parity condition to the picture, there may be important insights from studying 
foreign exchange interventions in these economies.  
Taking the above discussion as the starting point, this study analyzes both the causes 
and the effectiveness of the foreign exchange interventions conducted by the CBRT in 
the post-crisis period. Probit models along with the Granger causality tests are 
employed to reveal the preferences of the CBRT in its interventions. It has been found 
that, as officially stated by the CBRT, the excessive volatility emerges as the main 
motivation behind the interventions. On the other hand, “the signaling channel”, 
which states that interventions are effective since they reveal important information 
about future monetary policy actions, is not completely supported. Such a channel 
seems to operate only through purchase interventions.  
Regarding the effectiveness of interventions, GARCH models point out that neither 
purchase nor sale interventions are effective in changing the appreciation/depreciation 
trend of the Turkish lira, thus, not supporting the “leaning against the wind” 
hypothesis. However, this result is very much in line with the official statement of the 
CBRT, which explicitly announces that it has no intention to alter the level or the 
trend of the exchange rate. The main aim is stated as to decrease the volatility in the 
exchange rate. In that respect, large and isolated purchase interventions seem to be 
effective. However, this result cannot be supported by the sale interventions. Bearing 
in mind that almost all sale interventions took place in 2001, where the markets were 
still in turmoil, the analysis period may not be that appropriate to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the CBRT’s sale interventions. Finally, the estimation results of the 
GARCH models indicate that the uncovered interest rate parity condition for Turkey   20
operates such that there is a positive relationship between the interest rate and the 
depreciation rate of the Turkish lira between May 16, 2001 and December 31, 2003.  
There are two points that we have to pay attention in interpreting these results. First, 
the period witnesses mostly the rate cuts. Thus, we cannot have a clear picture about 
the operation of uncovered interest rate parity condition when, actually, the CBRT 
tightens its policy. Next, excluding the period right after the crisis, the Turkish lira 
was consistently in an appreciation trend. Again, we cannot have a robust policy 
implication when there is excessive volatility on a depreciation trend that would 
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